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1. Introduction  
T 
here has been a relatively long tradition of attempts to integrate the economies of 
East African countries. Starting in 1948 with the East African High Commission, 
several attempts have been made to foster deeper integration of Kenya, Tanzania and 
Uganda. With various factors playing confounding roles, most of these efforts finally 
failed. The most recent attempt, the new East African Community (EAC), however, 
reaches far beyond the failed efforts of the past. The new EAC treaty, agreed on in 
1999, envisages the establishment of first a customs union, then a common market, a 
monetary union and ultimately a political federation. The first step, the establishment 
of the EAC customs union, came into force in September 2004, aiming to eliminate all 
remaining intra-regional tariffs, remove non-tariff barriers and introduce a common 
external tariff.  
There have been fears that the application of provisions for the establishment of a 
customs union and a common market would lead to severe trade imbalances. These 
fears have been stated in all relevant documents of the EAC. For instance, Article 77 
of the treaty is titled “Measures to Address Imbalances Arising from the Application 
of the Provisions for the Establishment of a Customs Union and a Common Market” 
(EAC Secretariat, 2000, 52). Similarly, the problem of imbalances was also discussed 
in the first Development Strategy of the EAC, covering the period ranging from 1997 
to 2000. This strategy translated the vision of co-operation among the partner states 
into a comprehensive action programme including areas such as trade and industry, 
transport and communications, agriculture, environment, tourism, social and cultural 
activities and fiscal and monetary policies. In the strategy document, the problem of 
imbalances is cast in terms of costs and benefits: 
… while there are benefits accruing from regional integration, unequal 
distribution of the ensuing benefits has been a major shortcoming in many 
integration schemes, including the well-known case of the collapse of the 
defunct East African Community (Secretariat of the Permanent Tripartite 
Commission for East African Co-operation, 1997, 17). 
The second Development Strategy (2001–2005) again requests the distribution of 
benefits and costs and underlines the necessity of taking measures to address 
imbalances arising from the process of establishing a customs union and a common 
market. The strategy envisages that a study be commissioned to analyse the 
experiences of other regional blocs, with a view to adopting the most appropriate 
approaches for the EAC. It also envisages the establishment of a fund to address 
imbalances (EAC Secretariat, 2001). 
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In general, the theory of economic integration was founded on the seminal 
contribution of Viner (1950). He distinguished between two effects, one in which 
trade between partner countries expands in accordance with international comparative 
advantage, and the other in which trade between partner countries expands as a result 
of the preferential treatment given to imports from within the region as compared to 
those from the rest of the world. Viner named the former effect “trade creation”, 
where domestic products are substituted by imports of lower-cost goods produced by 
a country’s partner. The latter he called “trade diversion”, which refers to the shift in 
imports from the least-cost exporter to the more expensive product from the nation’s 
partner. 
While this categorisation is a helpful description of the effects of the formation of 
a customs union, it embraces only a part of the economic effects of such an 
arrangement. Further likely effects of a customs union are, for example, losses in tariff 
revenues due to the preferential tariff elimination or the exploitation of economies of 
scale due to an enhanced economic market. In sum, a country that enters a customs 
union may experience a welfare gain or loss, depending on the circumstances in each 
case. Moreover, individual firms may also gain or lose under the preferential trade 
agreement. Due to the possibility of losses at the country or firm level, powerful 
domestic interest groups may exert pressure on trade-policy formation and demand 
compensation, for instance, in the form of a temporary transitional fund to compensate 
for losses that occur due to the EAC customs union.  
The administrative mechanisms of such a transitional fund would have to be 
worked out in the study envisioned in the second Development Strategy. Such a fund 
would finance infrastructure and private industrial projects in the partner countries 
that incur the most losses, in order to improve their competitiveness. It would be a 
transitional fund, meaning that it would exist only for a certain period of time and 
would be abolished after imbalances are removed. The central question is whether 
such a transitional fund would be necessary. This would be the case if indeed the EAC 
were to have a severe impact on trade flows, and significant trade imbalances were to 
occur. For example, as a result of the trade and production structure of the EAC 
countries at present, the vast majority of the beneficial trade-enhancing effects of the 
EAC may occur in only one of the three East African countries. In that case, economic 
and political imbalances and frictions would be likely to arise.  
Against this background, this article will address two questions: (1) What are the 
likely overall trade effects of the EAC customs union? and (2) Which disaggregated 
commodities will be affected in particular? Section 2 surveys the structure of EAC 
trade flows and provides an overview of central features of the EAC in the past and at 
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present. With this historical background elucidated, section 3 explains the theoretical 
model used to estimate the trade effects. The results of the trade estimations are then 
presented in section 4. Based on these results, section 5 examines some aspects of the 
political economy of the proposed transitional fund and draws some conclusions. 
2. Historical Background and Achievements of the EAC 
I 
n November 1999, the treaty for the establishment of the new EAC was signed 
between the three partner states. According to Article 1 of this treaty, the objectives 
of the community “shall be to develop policies and programmes aimed at widening 
and deepening co-operation among the partner states in political, economic, social and 
cultural fields, research and technology, defence, security and legal and judicial 
affairs, for their mutual benefit” (EAC Secretariat, 2000, 12). 
As already mentioned in the previous section, the new EAC is only partly a new 
organisation. The first attempt to integrate the East African economies was the East 
African High Commission, established in 1948 with the purpose of controlling the 
public service in the British colonies of Kenya and Uganda and the British mandated 
territory of Tanganyika. After the independence of Tanganyika, the High Commission 
was transferred to the East African Common Service Organisation. Built on these first 
steps towards integration, the (old) East African Community was established in 1967 
(Mair, 2000). The old EAC made progress in creating important institutions and 
infrastructure, such as the East African Development Bank and the East African Legal 
Assembly. Moreover, important service facilities, for example the East African 
Harbours Corporation, East African Railways and East African Airways, became 
decentralised. 
From the beginning probably the most important problem threatening the 
existence of the old EAC was the industrial dominance of Kenya in the region, leading 
to growing deficits for Tanzania and Uganda in their trade with Kenya (Mair, 2000). 
Tanzania in particular was complaining about this situation and made a proposal to 
mitigate the problem. But attempts to improve the competitiveness of Tanzania and 
Uganda failed. The persistence of trade imbalances among the three partner states was 
therefore one of the main reasons for the collapse of the old EAC. Other major 
contributing factors were the concentration of regional administrative facilities in 
Kenya and contradictory economic orientations. At that time Kenya had a pure market 
economy, while Tanzania pursued Ujamaa-socialism and Uganda opted for a mixed 
economy. Moreover, growing political conflicts among the three countries and rising 
animosity among their leaders added to a climate of distrust (Mair, 2000).  
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As a result of these factors, the old EAC broke down in 1977 and Tanzania closed 
its border with Kenya. It was not until 16 years later that attempts to begin to revive 
the EAC and clear the way for a new foundation showed tangible results. In the 
Mediation Agreement, signed in 1984 to address the division of assets and liabilities 
of the former EAC, there was a provision to explore areas of future co-operation. On 
the basis of this provision, the heads of state of the three states agreed during a 
meeting in 1986 in Nairobi to promote the spirit of co-operation among their 
respective countries. On 30 November 1993, the three East African partner states 
signed an agreement establishing the Permanent Tripartite Commission for East 
African Co-operation, with a mandate to identify areas of co-operation and propose 
appropriate arrangements for regional co-operation.  
The EAC Secretariat was launched in March 1996, setting the basis for the 
adoption of the first EAC Development Strategy 1997–2000. This first development 
strategy formed the starting point for the establishment of the community in 1999. The 
strategy defined the guiding principles for co-operation, identified areas for co-
operation, defined priorities and made suggestions for strengthening the capacity to 
improve co-operation among the three partner countries. In addition, sectoral councils 
and sectoral committees were established to articulate on each agreed area of co-
operation.  
The subsequent East African Community Development Strategy 2001–2005 is 
based on the lessons learned from the first strategy and sets out the priority 
programmes to be implemented during the five-year period to which it refers. Above 
all, the first strategy was characterised by institutional inertia, a slow decision-making 
processes, inappropriate sequencing of certain activities and delays in implementation 
due to resource constraints. It also raised challenges related to managing the 
distribution and costs of integration (EAC Secretariat, 2001). 
In some areas the EAC has already made remarkable progress. For instance, prior 
to the full establishment of the customs union, intra-regional trade had been liberalised 
to a large extent. Kenya applied a preferential tariff reduction of – on average – 90 
percent on imports from the other two EAC members before the full establishment of 
the customs union in September 2004.
1 The tariff regimes of Tanzania and Uganda 
had been liberalised as well (see table 1). Likewise, non-tariff barriers on cross-border 
trade had been removed.  
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Table 1  Import Tariffs of EAC Countries, 2003 (in percentages) 
 
Country  Average tariff rate inside 
EAC 
Average tariff rate outside 
EAC 
Kenya*  1.9 13.3 
Tanzania  1.8 8.1 
Uganda 3.3 5.5 
Figures refer to applied import-weighted averages for the three East African countries 
prior to the establishment of the full customs union. 
* 2001. 
Source: UNCTAD (2004).  
 
Bilateral trade flows of the EAC member countries show that Kenya had significant 
trade surpluses with both Tanzania and Uganda in 2002, the latest year for which trade 
data for all three East African countries are available (table 2). All three EAC 
countries had a large (absolute) trade deficit with the rest of the world. On the other 
hand, the share of the current account deficit to GDP is particularly large in Tanzania 
and Uganda. Seen from this perspective, fears in Tanzania and Uganda about a further 
decline in their trade balances due to EAC tariff removal seemed to be 
comprehensible to a certain extent. 
 
Table 2  Trade Balance of EAC Countries, 2002 (US$ mill.) 
 
Bilateral trade surplus (+) / deficit (-) with  Reporting 
country  Kenya Tanzania  Uganda  World 
Total current account 
deficit in % of GDP 
Kenya   +85.9  +304.1  -1,674.0  -1.1 
Tanzania     -4.7  -965.2 -2.7 
Uganda       -605.6  -6.1 
Bilateral trade figures refer to trade in goods only, whereas the current account data 
also include imports and exports of services. 
Sources: ITC (2004) and World Bank (2004). 
Apart from the liberalisation of trade in goods, progress has also been made in the 
harmonisation of monetary and fiscal policies and in the institutional improvement of 
capital markets. A court of justice has already been established and a competition law 
is in the planning process. Other important areas where co-operation has made 
progress are industry, investment and customs, private-sector development, transport 
and communication, agriculture, energy, natural resources and the environment. Also, 
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the EAC has developed an Industrial Development Strategy, a Private Sector 
Development Strategy and an Agricultural and Rural Development Strategy. 
3. Analysing the Trade Effects of Economic Integration 
T 
he further elements of the EAC treaty referred to immediately above go far 
beyond the intended complete internal liberalisation of trade in goods. Due to 
data deficiencies and the fact that the steps ahead of the customs union are partly 
planned but not formally implemented in all countries, this section and the following 
one focus on the trade effects of the EAC customs union only.  
Quantitative analyses of the impact of a customs union on trade flows are 
typically performed in either a partial or general equilibrium framework.
2 By their 
very nature, partial equilibrium models allow highly detailed studies on the impact of 
trade policy changes to be made. In contrast, general equilibrium models, or 
computable general equilibrium (CGE) models, attempt to describe the effects of 
discriminatory tariff preferences on the economy as a whole and the intersectoral 
linkages in particular. In most cases, general equilibrium models are thus more 
suitable to analyse the overall trade and welfare effects; yet they require a social 
accounting matrix with detailed information on each of the involved economies, such 
as sectoral production data or substitution elasticities.  
Since the required data are not available for all three East African countries, we 
have to rely on an appropriate partial equilibrium model to analyse the trade effects of 
the EAC. Using a partial equilibrium model does have certain advantages. For 
example, it enables us to identify the commodities that will be particularly affected by 
the customs union. Also, such models require less data and fewer assumptions about 
key variables in the analysis. However, we have to keep in mind that partial 
equilibrium models do not take intersectoral linkages and income effects of tariff 
preferences into account and, hence, exclude some important aspects of trade 
liberalisation. 
Against this background, the model of Verdoorn (1960) will be used to estimate 
the impact of the EAC on trade flows. Despite its age, it is a suitable partial 
equilibrium model for the analysis of trade flows in the proposed EAC.
3 In the spirit 
of the “Armington assumption” (Armington, 1969), this model assumes product 
differentiation between supplying countries. More specifically, imported goods from 
different countries are considered to be imperfect substitutes in use. This assumption 
seems reasonable, since the majority of EAC trade consists of manufactured goods 
(table 3). 
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Table 3  Import Structure of EAC Countries, 2002 
 
  Total imports  
of Kenya 
Total imports  
of Tanzania 
Total imports  






mill.  %  US$ 
mill.  %  US$ 
mill.  %  US$ 
mill.  % 
Food, live animals, 
beverages and 
tobacco (0-1) 
212 6.9 196  11.3  109  10.1 40  8.9 
Raw  materials  (2-4)  752 24.5 334 19.3  254 23.6 220 49.1 
Manufactures (5-9)  2,112  68.6 1,198 69.4 711  66.3  188  42.0 
Total  3,075 100.0 1,729 100.0  1,074 100.0  447  100.0 
Source: ITC (2004). 
 
Verdoorn’s model is based on the normal assumptions of partial equilibrium analysis, 
such as no repercussions on exchange rates or incomes due to changing trade flows, 
iso-elastic import-demand functions, and infinite supply elasticities. The latter 
assumption, frequently applied in models of international trade, might be some cause 
for concern when applied to the case of the three East African countries. In reality, 
their elasticities of supply are less than infinite. Yet the share of intra-EAC exports in 
domestic production is not very large (table 4). For this reason, expected changes in 
total domestic production in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda are likely to be small, and 
the assumption of horizontal supply curves seems appropriate. 
 
Table 4  Exports and GDP of EAC Countries, 2002 
 
Country  Total exports in 
US$ mill. 
Total intra-EAC 
exports in US$ mill. 
Total intra-EAC exports 
in % of GDP 
Kenya 1,400  409  3.3 
Tanzania 763 44  0.5 
Uganda 467  68  1.2 
Source: ITC (2004) and World Bank (2004). 
 
To analyse the different trade effects the customs union may have, let us consider a 
particular commodity category, such as shoes. The consumer wishes to maximise his 
or her utility and may substitute different sorts of shoes, that is, domestically produced 
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shoes and imports of shoes from preferred and non-preferred countries.
4 Importantly, 
the analysis focuses on different sorts of imported shoes only. The consumer allocates 
expenditure to preferred and non-preferred imports subject to his or her budget 
constraint.  
Consider now the impact of a tariff elimination only on preferred imports. The 
chain reaction comes in two stages: first the tariff is eliminated only on preferred 
imports and their prices decline, and then the consumer substitutes preferred imports 
for non-preferred imports and domestically produced goods. The total trade effect can 
be separated into trade creation and trade diversion. Trade creation is defined as the 
change in imports from preferred countries that arises from the displacement of 
domestic production and an increase in demand due to the preferential tariff 
elimination. Trade diversion, on the other hand, refers to the replacement of non-
preferred with preferred imported goods. 
Estimation of trade creation and diversion in the differentiated product model 
requires estimates of import demand and substitution elasticities, respectively. Since 
reliable estimates for both elasticities cannot be arrived at for Kenya, Tanzania and 
Uganda, we are following the standard “Dutch” convention, which is to assume values 
of 0.5 and 2.0 for the import demand elasticity and the elasticity of substitution, 
respectively. These values are well within the range of similar elasticities of other 
countries.
5 Moreover, the assumed values are very similar to more recent estimates of 
import demand and substitution elasticities by Kee, Nicita and Olarreaga (2004) and 
Gallaway, McDaniel and Rivera (2003). 
4. Empirical Results 
B 
efore we present the estimated trade effects, we will first take a brief look at the 
data used. Trade and tariff data refer to the base year 2003. The exception is 
Kenya, since the most recent year for which disaggregated tariff data can be obtained 
for this country is 2001. The tariffs were obtained from the national tariff statistics of 
the three EAC countries and the UNCTAD Trade Analysis and Information System 
(TRAINS), which is a comprehensive computerised information system at the tariff-
line level using the harmonised system of product classifications (UNCTAD, 2004). 
The national tariffs were transformed into the Standard International Trade 
Classification (SITC, Revision 3).
6 The analysis has been performed at the two-digit 
SITC level, which allows a detailed specification of different products. 
The projections of the impact of the EAC customs union on trade flows can be 
seen in table 5. Total trade will increase by roughly US$17 million, or 3.3 percent. 
Trade creation and trade diversion amount to US$7.0 and US$9.8 million, 
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respectively. In comparison with Kenya and Tanzania, trade effects in Uganda can be 
expected to be a little bit larger with respect to both absolute and relative size. This 
outcome was to be expected, since intra-EAC tariff rates in Uganda are higher in 
comparison with Kenya and Tanzania. Yet for all three East African countries, trade 
diversion exceeds trade creation. From an economic point of view, trade creation is 
welfare improving, as consumers substitute lower-cost beneficiary imports for goods 
produced at home. Trade diversion, on the other hand, will decrease welfare, as a 
more efficient source of imports will be displaced by a higher-cost producer.  
 
Table 5  Trade Creation, Trade Diversion and Total Trade Effects of the EAC 
 
  Trade creation  Trade diversion  Total trade effects 
Country $  '000  %
a $  '000  %
b $  '000 %
a 
In Kenya  121  0.6  345  0.01  466  2.5 
In Tanzania  1,090  0.9  2,894  0.2  3,985  3.2 
In  Uganda  5,809 1.6  6,607 0.7 12,416 3.4 
Total  7,020 1.5  9,846 0.5 16,867 3.3 
a Of preferred imports.  
b Of non-preferred imports 
 
To check for the robustness of these results, we could, for instance, double both the 
assumed values for the elasticities of substitution and import demand to 4.0 and 1.0, 
respectively. As a consequence, trade creation and diversion would double as well.
7 
Hence, we have to keep in mind that the assumptions regarding both elasticities are 
crucial for the expected trade effects. Even though the assumed values for both 
elasticities are well within the range of estimates for other developing countries, they 
are still crude assumptions and may contain a bias. 
To see which of the three EAC countries benefits most from the preferential trade 
liberalisation, trade creation and diversion effects have been analysed at the country 
level (tables 6 and 7). In both cases Kenya profits most, with shares of 95 and 91 
percent of total trade creation and diversion, respectively. This result is clearly due to 
the relatively high export share of Kenyan exporters within the EAC. 
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Table 6  Distribution of Trade Creation Effects of the EAC 
 
  Kenya  Tanzania  Uganda  Total trade creation 
Country  $ '000  %
a  $ '000  %
a  $ '000  %
a  $ '000  %
a 
In  Kenya      97 81  24 19  121  100 
In Tanzania  1,042  96      48  4  1,090  100 
In Uganda  5,624  97  185  3      5,809  100 
Total 6,666  95  282  4  72  1  7,020  100 
a Of total trade creation. 
 
Table 7  Distribution of Trade Diversion Effects of the EAC 
  Kenya  Tanzania  Uganda  Total trade diversion 
Country  $ '000  %
a  $ '000  %
a  $ '000  %
a  $ '000  %
a 
In Kenya      277  80  68  20  345  100 
In Tanzania  2,782  96      112  4  2,894  100 
In Uganda  6,221  94  386  6      6,607  100 
Total  9,003  91  663 7  180 2  9,846  100 
a Of total trade diversion. 
 
Apart from the overall trade effects, there are considerable differences at the product 
level in all three East African countries (tables 8 to 10). At the two-digit level of the 
SITC, trade effects of up to 17 percent can be expected. On the other hand, there is no 
strong pattern of particular commodity groups that are affected most by the 
agreement. The commodity groups are rather scattered, as a large variety of different 
products are affected in all three EAC countries. 
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Table 8  Products in Kenya Most Affected by the EAC 
Trade creation  Trade diversion  Total trade effects   
Product category (SITC no.)  $ '000  in %
a  $ '000  in %
b  $ '000  in %
a 
Furniture  (82)  0.5  1.9 1.4 0.0  1.9  7.7 
Manufactures of metals (69)  0.8  1.9 2.4 0.0  3.2  7.7 
Nonmetallic mineral  
manufactures (66)  3.3  1.8 9.9 0.0 13.2 7.0 
Rubber manufactures (62)  2.2  1.7 6.6 0.0  8.8  6.8 
Paper and articles of paper (64)  0.1  1.7 0.3 0.0  0.4  6.8 
Sugars, sugar preparations  
and honey (06)  0.3  1.7 0.8 0.0  1.1  6.8 
Articl. of apparel & clothing 
accessories (84)  0.2  1.7 0.5 0.0  0.6  6.8 
Footwear  (85)  0.3  1.7 0.8 0.0  1.1  6.7 
Dairy products (02)  0.3  1.7  0.9  0.0  1.2  6.7 
Miscellaneous manufactured 
articles (89)  3.0  1.7 9.0 0.0 12.0 6.7 
a Of preferred imports.  
b Of non-preferred imports. 
 
Table 9  Products in Tanzania Most Affected by the EAC   
Trade creation  Trade diversion  Total trade effects   
Product category (SITC no.)  $ '000  in %
a  $ '000  in %
b  $ '000  in %
a 
Beverages (11)  7.6  4.3  22.4  0.3  30.0  17.1 
Oilseeds and oleaginous  
fruits (22)  0.1  2.4 0.3 0.0  0.4  9.5 
Travel goods, handbags (83)  1.1  2.4  3.1  0.1  4.2  9.5 
Fish  (03)  0.2  2.4 0.6 0.1  0.8  9.4 
Furniture  (82)  8.0  2.4  23.2  0.2 31.1 9.3 
Sugars, sugar preparations  
and honey (06)  19.6 2.4  56.9  0.2 76.5 9.2 
Cork and wood (24)  0.1  2.3  0.3  0.1  0.4  9.1 
Vegetables and fruit (05)  3.3  2.3 9.7 0.2 13.1 9.0 
Articl. of apparel & clothing 
accessories (84)  6.9  2.2  20.4  0.1 27.4 8.9 
Coffee, tea, cocoa, spices (07)  2.6  2.4 6.9 0.9  9.5  8.6 
a Of preferred imports.  
b Of non-preferred imports. 
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Table 10  Products in Uganda Most Affected by the EAC 
Trade creation  Trade diversion  Total trade effects   
Product category (SITC no.)  $ '000  in %
a  $ '000  in %
b  $ '000  in %
a 
Fish  (03)  1.0  2.8 2.8 0.3  3.8 11.0 
Travel goods, handbags (83)  6.3  2.8  18.0  0.4  24.3  10.9 
Vegetables and fruit (05)  22.9 2.8  61.3  0.9  84.2  10.4 
Furniture (82)  22.7  2.8  60.0  1.0  82.8  10.3 
Prefabricated buildings (81) 10.8  2.6  30.5  0.4  41.3  10.0 
Articl. of apparel & clothing 
accessories (84)  54.4  2.7 145.0 0.9  199.4  9.9 
Sugars, sugar preparations 
and honey (06)  45.8  2.6 121.5 0.9  167.3  9.6 
Footwear  (85)  84.8  2.8 199.7 1.8  284.6  9.4 
Road vehicles (78)  138.0  2.4 393.4 0.4  531.4  9.3 
Dairy products (92)  21.0  2.8  46.7  2.2  67.7  9.1 
a Of preferred imports.  
b Of non-preferred imports. 
 
In a further analysis, the trade effects of the new external tariff of the customs union 
were computed. The new external tariff applies to all three EAC countries, regardless 
of individual national tariff rates at the moment. It has been agreed to apply a tariff 
rate of zero percent for primary raw materials, essential drugs, medical equipment, 
plant and agricultural inputs, 10 percent for intermediate goods/inputs and 25 percent 
for finished goods for imports. These tariff rates apply for all imports from outside the 
EAC.  
As table 11 illustrates, the new tariff structure will lead to a decline in total extra-
EAC imports by US$211 million, or 4.1 percent. The relative decline in total imports 
is particularly large in Tanzania and Uganda, where imports will decrease by -4.6 and 
-5.4 percent, respectively. This outcome is clearly due to the fact that both countries 
would have to raise their overall tariff levels vis-à-vis the rest of the world 
considerably. 
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Table 11  Total Trade Effects Due to New External EAC Tariff 
 
  Total trade effects 
Country  $ '000  %
a 
In Kenya  -61,184  -2.0 
In Tanzania  -95,371  -4.6 
In Uganda  -54,164  -5.4 
Total -210,719  -4.1 
a Of non-preferred imports. 
 
Finally, both trade projections, trade creation and diversion on the one hand and the 
introduction of a new external EAC tariff on the other, were put together to see their 
combined impact on total exports, imports and the respective trade balances of all 
three EAC countries (table 12). The trade balances of all three East African countries 
are likely to improve significantly, due to lower imports from outside the EAC and 
improved exports within the EAC. Interestingly, based on our results, the trade 
balance of Tanzania will improve even more than that of Kenya, thereby failing to 
substantiate fears that the implementation of the new customs union could lead to a 
deterioration of the trade balance in that country. 
 
Table 12  Changes in Exports, Imports and Trade Balance Due to EAC Trade  
    Liberalisation and New External EAC Tariff ($ '000) 
Changes in    
Country  Exports
a Imports
b  Trade balance  
In Kenya  15,669  -61,063  76,732 
In Tanzania  945  -94,281  95,226 
In Uganda  252  -48,355  48,607 
Total 16,866  -203,699  220,565 
a Total trade creation + total trade diversion for each country.  
b Total trade effect due to new external EAC tariff + trade creation for each country.  
 
The main results of this article can be summarised as follows: First, the relative size of 
the estimated trade effects shows that fears in both Tanzania and Uganda about 
negative trade balance effects following the completion of the EAC customs union 
seem to be misguided. Second, Kenya is likely to profit most from the liberalisation of 
intra-EAC trade. Tanzania and Uganda, on the other hand, will gain less from 
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completing the customs union. Yet their trade balances will improve overall due to the 
higher level of the new external EAC tariff. In fact, the relatively high new external 
tariff will lead not to trade liberalisation, but to more trade restrictions vis-à-vis 
countries outside the customs union. Third, at the product level there are considerable 
differences among the three East African countries. There is no strong pattern of 
particular commodity groups that are affected most by the customs union. The 
commodity groups are rather scattered, as a large variety of different products are 
affected in all three EAC countries. 
On the face of it, the results with respect to changes in trade balances in all EAC 
countries are at odds with recent findings by Venables (2003), who analysed the 
benefits and costs of a customs union for member countries in a Ricardian trade model 
and a Heckscher-Ohlin framework. According to his results, low-income countries are 
much better served by “north-south” than by “south-south” customs unions, as 
integration between developing countries tends to lead to divergence of member 
country incomes; that is, Tanzania and Uganda may indeed experience a welfare 
decline. In line with Venables’ results, our results show that Kenya is likely to benefit 
from the EAC customs union; however, Tanzania’s and Uganda’s trade balances will 
improve due to the new (higher) external tariff. Nevertheless, individual firms or 
industries in both countries may lose under the preferential agreement. 
5. Policy Implications and Concluding Remarks  
G 
iven the results of our calculations, it is not easy to explain the persistence of 
fears of severe trade imbalances due to the establishment of the EAC customs 
union or, therefore, to justify the case for a transitional fund. All in all, potential losses 
due to the establishment of the customs union would be small and could easily be 
absorbed by proper adjustment mechanisms. Apart from historical experience, one 
reason a case has been made for a transitional fund may be the influence of 
stakeholders on the regional integration policy in East Africa.
8 According to 
Maasdorp (1999), who compiled a report on that issue for the EAC Secretariat, there 
is a strong perception in both Tanzania and Uganda that their manufacturing sectors 
would not be able to compete with Kenyan producers in a customs union.  
In annex  IV of his report, Maasdorp cites a local consultant’s perspective on 
Tanzania, assessing the perception of Tanzanian business regarding EAC free trade. 
Major trade imbalances between the partner states, particularly between Kenya and 
Tanzania are seen as the main problem and challenge facing the EAC. The Tanzanian 
industrialists share the view that “the imposition of zero internal tariffs would 
generate trade creation and trade diversion effects in Kenya’s favour which would 
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further widen the trade imbalance in Kenya’s favour” (Maasdorp, 1999, 143). From 
the Tanzanian industrialists’ point of view, a real danger exists that the EAC will 
collapse if the issue of trade imbalances between Kenya and Tanzania is not properly 
addressed. The report by Maasdorp does not contradict these views, and it 
recommends establishing a regional fund. 
In general, the envisioned benefit of a transitional fund exists in compensating 
those who lose from economic integration. In the case of considerable losses such a 
fund may in fact ease the political and economic process of integration. But even in 
this case, a transitional fund is not without drawbacks. To begin with, its 
establishment is likely to increase administrative costs. A bureaucracy has to be set up 
and transaction costs for all parties involved may rise. This reduces the total amount 
of money that can be redistributed toward declining sectors. Also, the fund may 
produce a sectoral bias in favour of uncompetitive sectors and firms. Allowances may 
be paid under the condition that the respective firms adjust and improve their 
competitiveness, but in the case where this does not work, scarce funds for economic 
development would be wasted. Finally, the fund may lead to rent-seeking activities 
and to an increase in corruption. Even firms not suffering from increased import 
competition from partner states would be stimulated to use the transitional fund. This 
would lead to a growth of the fund activities, and the institution might easily get out of 
control and thus harm economic activities in the East African partner states.  
To sum up, based on the results presented in this paper, a transitional fund is not 
only unnecessary in the case of the EAC, but if established could become a source for 
rent seeking and corruption. The implementation of the customs union should not be 
impeded by fears related to the expected trade effects. 
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Endnotes 
                                                       
*    This article is partly based on a study conducted for the GTZ (Gesellschaft für 
Technische Zusammenarbeit) and the EAC Secretariat in Arusha. We would like 
to thank both organisations for allowing us to publish a part of our study. Also, 
special thanks to Boubacar Sokona for his excellent research assistance and to 
Carsten Hefeker, Karl Fasbender and participants at various seminars for helpful 
suggestions and comments. The usual disclaimer applies. 
1.    This applies to customs duties at the tariff line level. Import-weighted tariffs at 
the two-digit level of the Standard International Trade Classification, however, 
can differ from the overall level of trade liberalisation, as table 1 shows. 
2.    For estimating the effects of dismantling trade barriers, other studies have used 
gravity models, which focus on bilateral trade flows between partner countries. 
See Musila (2004) and Ghosh and Yamarik (2004) for more recent studies using 
gravity models. 
3.    It can be shown that Verdoorn’s model is a simplified version of the more general 
partial equilibrium model of Clague (1971, 1972). See Busse (1996) and Busse 
and Koopmann (2002) for details. 
4.    See the technical annex for a more formal explanation of Verdoorn’s model.  
5.    See Sawyer and Sprinkle (1999) for a survey of trade elasticities.  
6.    The concordances can be found in United Nations (1986). 
7.    See also the appropriate equations (6) and (7) in the technical annex. 
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8.    Examples of such stakeholders are the Confederation of Tanzania Industries, the 
Kenya Association of Manufacturers, Uganda Manufacturers Association and 
Chambers of Commerce and Industry. 